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March 2, 1984 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 83-1334 
~~ -&4-j /2.~£ /l.UJ ~ 
1-btion of Resporxlent to Expedite ~ 
W001W (City Sheriff), et al. 
( Conm. Atty. ) 
v. 
LEE (att. robbery suspect) 
Consideration of Petition for ~ 
Certiorari. (Also Petition for  
Writ of Cert) ~ --7 
1-btion of Respoment for Leave &~ ~ ~ 
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis - ..... - ry 
SUMMARY: Resp, a suspect in an attempted robbery wh:> has an allegedly 
incriminatory bullet lodged in his ernst, moves for expedited review of the 
~
gov~nt' s cert petn. On cert, the government seeks to determine whether 
the CA 4 erred in enjoining petr on Fourth Amerrlment grourxls from performing 
any inwluntary surgery urxler a general anesthetic to remove a bullet lodged 
one inch below resp's skin. 
FlCI'S: en July 18, 1982 at approximately 1:00 a.m., Ralph Watkinson was 
closing his store in Richmorxl, Va. He noticed an armed stranger approaching 
from across the street. Watkinson drew his own gun and exchanged soots. Both 
persons received gunsoot wourxls, am the stranger fled. Watkinson called 
~r4 1'\f Vlt o tco~ { D-(AA'f rrrf-
])~,·J 
--- - ~ ---
the police who apprehetxied resp about eight blocks from Watkinson's store 
about 20 minutes after the incident had occurred. Resp was suffering from a 
gunsmt woutxi to the left side of his chest. Resp atxi Watkinson were 
transported separately to a local mspital but were placed in the same --------,_ 
emer&:._ncy room by ~i_:al personnel. When Watkinson saw resp, he exclaimed: 
"'Iha.t' s the man that smt me." Resp explained to police that he had himself 
been the victim of a robbery by two males wm had smt him. After 
investigating, the police determined resp 's story to be tmtrue a.txi charged him 
with four felony counts • 
The governnent sought to obtain the bullet from resp 's chest as 
evidence. Resp refused. The govern:nent moved in Riclm:>nd Circuit Court to 
compel production of the evidence. At:. a hearing, a forensic scientist a.txi the 
surgeon who would ranove the bullet testified that the surgery would entail 
little risk of harm or injury because the bullet was believed to be only 
I one-half centimeter below the skin and could be removed with the use of local anesthesia. en this testimony, the circuit court ordered the surgery. It 
stayed its order petxiing review in the Virginia S.Ct., which denied resp' s 
request for a writ of prohibition. 
Resp then filed a petn for a writ of habeas corpus in the DC (ED Va.) as 
well as a suit utxier 42 U.S.C. §1983 in an attempt to enjoin the state from 
proceeding with the surgery. .Agreeing that resp would likely suffer no risk 
of harm, the DC (Merhige) denied all relief on October 15, 1982. ----------c 
Preparation began on October 18, 1982 at the Medical College of Virginia 
to ranove the bullet. Resp again protested the surgery atxi the surgeon 
refused to perform the operation against resp 's will. A secotxi surgeon was 
designated, and he ordered the starx:lard pre-surgery tests. X-rays performed 
at this time daoonstrated that the bullet was much deeper in the chest wall 
\....__., than initially believed. Specifically, the bullet was found to be 
approximately 2.5 centimeters beneath the skin. .As a result, the new surgeon l 
decided that general anestresia, rather than local would be necessary. 
When resp 's counsel was informed, he moved for rehearing in the Ricnnon:i 
Circuit Court on the same day, October 18, 1982. en the following day, the 
circuit court scheduled a hearing for October 21, 1982. Resp 's counsel 
unsuccessfully requested additional time to prepare arxl urged the court to 
grant a continuaoce to permit him to obtain an irxleperxlent expert or to 
develop expertise in anesthesiology prior to the court's decision. The 
circuit court denied resp 's request BIXi ordered that the surgery proceed. 
Resp filed a similar mtion for a rehearing in the DC, which granted the 
request BIXi allowed resp two weeks to prepare. In the subsequent hearing, 
resp presented a general surgeon woo testified about the medical risks. After 
hearing the evidence, the DC concluded that surgery tn:rler the new 
circumstances--particularly the use' of general anestresia and the necessarily 
greater intrusion into resp 's body--would constitute an unreasonab~search 
urxler the Fourth .Amerxlment. llccordingly the court enjoined the state from 
proceeding with the surgery an:1 issued a writ of habeas corpus. Petr appealed 
to CA 4. 
CA 4 DECISIOO: (1) CA 4 (Phillips, Sprouse) (Widener, dissenting} first 
so~ht to determine whether the claim smuld be considered cognizable solely 
urxler 42 U.S.C. §1983 or urxler 28 U.S.C §2254. It concluded that injuoctive 
relief tn:rler civil rights provisions was mre appropriate than habeas corpus. 
The court reasoned that habeas is primarily a vehicle for attack by a confined 
person on the legality of custody where the relief would be release. en the 
other harxl, §1983 relief is provided to one seeking to enjoin persons acting 
tn:rler color of state law from depriving a citizen of a constitutional right. 
(2) CA 4 next sought to determine wrether collateral estq>pel smuld 
apply to bar the §1983 claim on the ground that it relitigates issues decided 
- .... - - --
adversely to resp in the state criminal proceedings. Q.d.ded by .Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) and Kremer v. <llemical Construction Corp., 456 
U.S. 461 (1982), the CA 4 stated that it was unable to determine whether the 
Virginia courts would give the earlier decisions preclusive effect. 
Nevert~less, CA 4 stated that full faith and credit is not required to be 
given to the state proceedings wrere they have failed to satisfy the minimum 
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amernment. Given the 
fact that resp made several pleas for a continuance arxi that he was given 
insufficient time in t~ state court proceedings to prepare (two days), CA 4 
concluded that he was denied procedural fairness. 
(3) Finally, CA 4 turned to the reasonableness of the intrusion. CA 4 
acknowledged that the controlling principles are those emmciated in Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952). Schnerber up~ld the admissibility of test results on blood 
involuntarily rexooved from a defemant. However, it cautioned that only minor 
intrusions would be permissible, stating: 
The integrity of an irrlividual 1 s person is a c~ris~d value 
in our society. '!bat we today rold that the Constitution does 
not forbid the States 1 minor intrusions into an irxUvidual 1 s body 
umer stringently limited conditions in no way imicates that 
it permits xoore substantial intrusions, or intrusions urxier 
other comitions. Id. at 772. 
In Rochin, the Court comemned the use of stomach-pumping to extract evidence 
from a suspect. ~e recently in United States v. Cra\\tier, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. 
Cir. , 1976) ~ bane), the Court stated that the reasonableness of removing a 
bullet forcibly from a person 1 s body is judged by the extent of the surgical 
intrusion am the extent of the risk to the person. Id., at 316. In 
application of t~se principles, CA 4 foum the proposed surgergy to be too 
intrusive because: the bullet is lodged approximately 2.5 to 3 centimeters in 
the nruscle tissue; it would require an incision of 5 centimeters to extract; 
• 
such surgery exposes resp to risks of injury to the IIDJscle, nerves, blood 
vessels arxi other tissue, as well as increased risk of infection; the 
procedure would require administration of general anestresia which includes a 
probable morphine injection, as well as soditun pentathol, a barbiturate, arxi a 
continuous gaseous mixture of oxygen and nitrous oxide; and surgery might last 
up to two-arxi -one-half hours. 
(4) .Accordingly, CA 4 affirmed the order permanently enjoining petrs 
from proceeding with tre surgery. lbwever it vacated that portion of the OC' s 
order which granted habeas relief. 
CA 4 DISSENT: In dissent, Judge Widener expressed his disapproval of 
federal court intervention especially where an injunction is issued regarding 
state criminal proceedings, citing Younger v. HBrrls , 401 U.S. 3 7 (1971) , and 
in the abseoce of proven governnental harassment or prosecutions undertaken in 
bad faith, citing Perez v. Ledesna, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). en the facts of this 
case, Judge Widener disagreed that resp was denied a full arxi fair opportunity 
to present his state case, and further disagreed that the risks atteming 
surgery were too great. 
CXNTENI'ICN5 rn WE MERITS: Petrs contem that cert smuld be granted for 
two reasons. First, petrs contem that a conflict exists between Cro-wder arxi 
the present case. In Cro-wder, the suspect had two bullets in his body: 
reiOOVal of the one in the leg was forbidden as it might have caused reduction 
or loss of :fuoction; removal of tre one fran the forearm was deemed minor 
surgery arxi was permitted. The instant case presents a set of circtunstaoces 
falling in between tmse in Cro-wder. Ibwever, the CA 4 followed the Scbnerber 
rule which limits intrusions to the "prick of the needle." CXl such 
interpretation, the present case is in conflict with Cro-wder. Secorxi, petrs 
contem that this Court must define the Fourth Amemment proscriptions against 
unreasonable searches in this area to aid law enforcement in cases such as 
-~-- - v-
this where the bullet is one inch below the surface. Five states and the 
District of Colun:bia have authorized court-ordered surgery to reiOOVe evidence 
in criminal prosecutions. A rule of unifonnity must therefore be established 
by this Court. 
Resp contends that this case presents no conflict with Cro\\lder. The CA. 4 
cited Crower with approval, but distinguished it. Moreover, the CA. 4 did not 
construe Scrmerber to state that no intrusion greater than a needle is 
permissible. Simply stated, the two courts have applied the same principle to 
different facts, and have reached urx:lerstandably different conclusions. 
Secondly, the state cases cited by petr are distinguishable from the present 
case. l'bne of tmse cited ordered such extensive surgery under general 
anesthesia as that involved here. 
OJNI'ENI'IOO rn TilE M<JI'ICN: Resp urges expedited consideration of the 
cert petn to resolve the criminal charges that have been pending since July 
1982. 
DISClBSICN: This case does not challenge whether Schnerber and Rochin 
establish the proper test regarding the reasonableness urx:ler the Fourth 
Amendment of intrusions into the body. The parties do not appear to disagree 
that minor intrusions into the body under stringently limited conditions do 
not offerxi the Fourth Amendment. The present disagreement merely concerns 
. 
1
7:J application of that principle. When the bullet was tho~ht to be only 
~ ~ slightly below the s~face of the skin and removable under local anesthesia, 
the courts below were uniform in their mlding that court-ordered reiOOVal was 
l 
proper. 'Wl'el the bullet was later discovered to be significantly deeper, the 
DC and CA. 4 majority again applied the Scltnerber test and found the intrustion 
no longer to be minor. .Accordingly, petrs were enjoined from performing the 
surgery and the case is fact-specific. 
Moreover, the conflict cited by petr is strained. As reap states, the 
CA 4 in the present case and the Cl:"c>Wer court simply applied tre same rule to 
different facts and reacred necessarily different conclusions. 
Because the uncertainty of surgery has surrouroed this lit:J.ga.tion for 
nearly two years, expedited review seems warranted. 
I recOIIIIleiXi that the motion to expedite be granted am that the petn for 
cert be denied. 
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
Q~t-r.fhu;,;. ~ frPv{/ Circulated: MAR 2 8 1984 
-tv fo.. +-u .._ fr -
J),w;,( 
1st DRAFT 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF AND AUBRY M. 
DAVIS, JR. v. RUDOLPH LEE, JR. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No. 83--1334. Decided March-, 1984 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari. 
In the early morning hours of July 18, 1982, a Richmond 
storekeeper observed an armed man approaching his store. 
The storekeeper drew his gun and opened fire. The ap-
proaching stranger returned the fire and during the ensuing 
shoot-out, both men were hit by gunfire. Within minutes 
after the shooting, Richmond police apprehended respondent 
about eight blocks from the store. Respondent was suffer-
ing from a gunshot wound to the left side of his chest and was 
taken to the same hospital emergency room where the store-
keeper had been brought. The storekeeper, upon seeing re-
spondent, exclaimed, "That's the man who shot me." 
After respondent's explanation for the gunshot wound 
proved unconvincing, he was charged with four felony counts 
arising out of the attempted robbery of the storekeeper. 
The Commonwealth Attorney for the c· 
a motion to compel evidence to re er surgically the bullet 
in respondent's chest. After sev ral hearings on the stat ' 
motion, at which the Richmond · · testi-
mony from a forensic scientist and the surgeon who would re-
move the bullet, the court ruled that the bullet could be prop-
erly removed, since the surgery was a minor procedure that 
would be done in a hospital under medical conditions that 
would protect respondent's health. At the time the Circuit 
Court made its ruling, it was believed that the bullet was 
only one-half centimeter below the skin and could be removed 
WI~nesthesia. 
2 WINSTON v. LEE 
After respondent's petitions for writs of habeas corpus and 
prohibition were denied by the Virginia Supreme Court, he 
fil~d a petition for writ of habeas cor us ~d a suit under 42 
U. S. C. 1983 in federal district court to enjoin the state 
fromproceeding with the surgery. The Distrfct Court ini-
tially agreed with the state circuit court that the surgery pre-
sented virtually no risk of harm to respondent and denied his 
request for relief. Subsequently, a new surgeon was ob-
tained to perform the surgery, who determined following ad-
/ 
ditional testing that the bullet was approximately 2.5 centi-
meters beneath the skin, somewhat deeper than mitlally 
eStilliated. Because of the greater depth of tl'ie l5ulle , the 
surgeon determined that general anesth~a, rather than 
local anesthesia, should be usea Eo perform the surgery. 
Respondent then filed a motion for rehearing in Richmond 
Circuit Court, claiming that the surgery would now violate 
his Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable search. 
The Richmond Circuit Co~rt ~led that the surgery could 
proceed as planne ecause tller'e was no materia c ange of 
circ~mstance. Respondent then filed for a new hearing on 
his federal claims in District Court. The District Court con- ~ 
eluded that the new circumstances, especially the use of gen-
eral anesthesia and e more extensive surgery, would con-
stitute an unreasonabie search under the -rourth 
Amen ment. 51 F. upp. , 261 (E. D. Va. 1982). 
~ The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
_ J/1 ~ding of the District Court on the Fourth Amendment 
C f+- WV r issue. 717 F. 2d 888 (1983). Applying what it believed 
were the controlling principles established by this Court in 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the proposed surgery was not the 
type of minor intrusion on body sanctity authorized in 
Schmerber. The court concluded that because the surgery in 
this case had some potential risk and could result in trauma 
or pain, the surgery constituted an unreasonable search 
within the mearung of the Fourt e 
i?Lf ;v r/G 
~~~ 
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enjoined.' Judge Widener dissented, arguing that the 
record indicated that removal of the bullet was in every way 
routine. 
This case presents an important and recurring question 
concerning the necessity for court-ordered surgery to secure 
evidence relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The 
lower federal courts and various state courts have spli~ 
widejy on whether Schmerber authorizes more inva · ur---------- -----gi al procedures to recover evidence such as a bullet. Com--------------------------pare nited States v. Crowder, 543 F. 2d 312 (CADC 1976) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); Hughes v. 
State, 466 A. 2d 533 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1983); State v. 
Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A. 2d 556 (1982); State v. 
Richards, 585 S. W. 2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); and 
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S. E. 2d 350 (1972), cert. 
dismissed, 410 U. S. 975 (1973), with Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 
25 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 
S. W. 2d 879 (1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362 
N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. 1974); and Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 
663, 299 N. E. 2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935 
' The District Court had granted respondent's habeas petition and 
awarded him injunctive relief on his § 1983 claim. The Court of Appeals 
determined that respondent's claim was not cognizable on habeas, since his 
claim related only to conditions of confinement, nottJle fact or confinement 
as such. The propriety of this ruling may be open to some doubt, see 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 499-500 (1973), but the issue is raised 
only by respondent in his cross-petition. See Brief of Petitioner in No. 
83-{)351. A more problematic aspect of the decision below is the major-
ity's complete fai ure 0 ear witfi tne younger abstentiOn questiOns raise 
by the District Court's I11Junction issued agrunst tfie state m a criminal pro-
cee mg. In t e companion cases ofYoungerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) 
and Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971),-we held that principles of feder-
alism prevented federal courts from granting injunctive relie""f against 
pending state prosecutions un ess e prosecu Ions were undertaken in bad 
fai or o er ex raordin circumstances prevailed. While the present 
inJunction does not prevent the State from prosecuting respondent, I be-
lieve the injunction raises an important federalism question. The State 
does not press the issue in its petition, however. 
4 WINSTON v. LEE 
(1974). See also State v. Allen, 291 S. E. 2d 459 (S. C. 
1982). While the proposed surgery plainly presents a 
greater intrusion to respondent than did the blood sampling 
taken in Sch;nerb"ir, I do not believe that the reasonableness 
clauseof the Fourth Amendment necessarily proscribes this 
surgery. 2 We have never held that the minimal intrusions 
represented by the prick of a needle or scraping of a finger-
nail are the outer limits beyond which the State may not go to 
obtain evidence. Cf. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 (1973); 
Schmerber v. California, supra. Indeed, the record in this 
case indicates that the surg_e~ <!_e~~ded ~by the Stat~ is 
fairly minor in character. The bullet is estimated to be less 
than an rnchdeep, t e Incision to remove the bullet woulcfte 
small, and the time in surgery would be, by one estimate, 20 
minutes or less. The Court of Appeals, however, treated 
our decision in Schmerber as the outer boundary to obtaining 
evidence from a person's body. 1 woula grant certiorari in 
this case to review this question and provide guidance to the 
2 The Fourth Circuit in this case seemed to view Schmerber as the outer 
limit to permissible medical procedures for obtainmgevuTence, but the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit employs a more flexi-
ble approach in determining whether surgery will be permitted to obtain 
evidence. In United States v. Crowder, 543 F. 2d 312 (CADC 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977), the appellate court was presented with a de-
fendant who had been shot twice, once in the thigh and once in the forearm. 
The court established a four part test to determine whether surgery would 
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Under its standard, sur-
gery was permissible if relevant evidence could be obtained no other way, 
the surgery was minor and every precaution would be taken, the defendant 
had an opportunity for an adversary hearing to contest the state's motion 
to compel surgery, and appellate review was available prior to surgery. 
Applying its test, the court determined that the bullet in the defendant's 
thigh could not be removed because it posed a risk of reducing the use or 
function of the defendant's leg, but the bullet in the defendant's forearm 
could be removed since the surgery presented a negligible risk. A fair 
reading of the standard applied in Crowder suggests that in the District of 
Columbia Circuit, at least, the State's motion in this case would have been 
granted. 
WINSTON v. LEE 5 
lower courts to determine under what circumstances a court 
may order surgery to recover evidence from a person. 
L.uurr; ••.••••••••••••••••• Jiotea on .......••......•.. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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ADSEN'l' NOT VOTI NG 
No. 83-1334, Winston, et al. v. Lee 
Memorandum to File 
This is a summary memo on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
This is the CA 4 case involving the attempt of Virginia 
authorities to obtain court approval to remove a bullet from 
the shoulder of respondent Lee. The petitioners are Winston, 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, and Aubrey Davis, Common-
weath's Attorney. Respondent is charged with attempted 
robbery and wounoing of a storekeeper named Watkinson. In a 
"gun battle" between respondent and Watkinson, both were 
wounded. Petitioners obtained authority from the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond to remove the bullet lodged 
approximately one inch below the surface of respondent's skin. 
Respondent - following various proceedings that no longer 
are relevant - brought this suit in federal DC to enjoin the 
state from carrying out the court order to remove the bullet. 
Respondent's complaint sought relief in federal habeas corpus 
under §2254 and also injunctjve relief under §1983. 
The DC apparently thought relief was appropriate under 
both statutes (I am not sure of this), and enjoined enforcement 
of the state court order. On appeal, in a typically long 
opinion by Judge Phillips, joined by Judge Sprouse, CA 4 
I .___ 
No. 83-1334 2. 
affirmed. It considered §2254 an inappropriate remedy as 
respondent was not seeking freedom from jail where CA 4 
found he properly was detained. Rather, CA 4 construed the 
complaint as alleging a violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
for which §1983 afforded a proper means of injunctive relief. 
Various issues were involved, the more serious of which 
was whether federal courts were precluded by collateral 
estoppel from reviewing the state court order. By reasoning 
that is unpersuasive to me (see dissenting opinion of Judge 
Widener), CA 4 held that Allen v. McCurry did not compel 
collateral estoppel because respondent had been "denied 
procedural fairness" in the state courts. As the State of 
Virginia does not contest the collateral estoppel ruling, 
or indeed any other procedural ruling, the only question 
presented is whether removal of the bullet pursuant to a 
state court order would violate respondent's Fourth Amendment 
rights. That Amendment provides, of course, that persons 
shall be "secure in their persons ... against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." Thus, the question is whether the 
proposed involuntary surgery would constitute an unreasonable 
search of respondent's person. 
No. 83-1334 3. 
CA 4 correctly recognized that the primary authority is 
Schmerber v. California, 384 u.s. 757. Also Rochin v. 
California, 342 u.s. 165 is relevant. 
CA 4 ruled that the "basic principle" to be derived from 
these cases is that: 
"Once the state has demonstrated the 
relevancy of evidence and the inability 
to obtain it otherwise, the reasonableness 
of removing it forceably from a person's 
body is judged by the extent of the 
surgical intrusion and the extent of the 
risk to the person." --
. Apparently the medical testimony in this case was extensive 
(there were two hearings, the second revealing that the bullet 
was more deeply embedded than initially thought), and the 
majority view of the evidence differs quite considerably from 
Judge Widener's view. Subject to more careful consideration, 
my impression is that the facts are not in dispute. The loca-
tion of the bullet, its size, the nature of the medical proce-
dure and the anesthesia required - all of these are not 
contested. The opinions of the physicians do differ in degree. 
No. 83-1334 4. 
The CA 4 majority took the gloomier picture. It perceived 
risk in cutting muscles, even when the wound is shallow. 
General anesthesia was thought to entail risks, although 
the great weight of medical authority - specifically with 
respect to respondent - was to the contrary. Some physicians 
describe the surgery as "minor", and others apparently use 
different language without characterizing it as "major". 
There is a view, that makes some sense, that any "cutting" 
of the body that requires general anesthesia is not minor. 
It is not easy for me to identify the legal question in 
this case. The brief on behalf of the state is poorly 
written, apparently without help from the Attorney General's 
Office. It argues that CA 4 has adopted a "per se" rule to 
the effect that "all intrusions into the human body are 
per se unconstitutional". Br. p. 8, et seq. 
\ I do not read CA 4's opinion as adopting any such rule, 
although it does read Schmerber very narrowly. 
This is another case we should not have taken. The more 
importa.nt issue - at least for me - is whether CA 4 erred in 
its denial of collateral estoppel. I would think that a 
strong persumption exists that where a state court has acted 
in a case of this kind, a federal court should not intervene 
except in circumstances far clearer than those that exist in 
this case. There had been hearings and proceedings in the 
No. 83-1334 5. 
state courts that Judge Widener thought were entirely con-
sistent with due process. But the state did not appeal this 
issue. Perhaps we can clarify Schmerber, but this probably 
is not necessary. Case appears to involve only opinions as 
to the seriousness of the intrusion (the cutting) and the 
risk of a general anesthetic. (As I have had this in six 
major operations, the risk is not as great as driving auto 
under certain conditions). 
LFP 
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~~~~~~ 
Question Presented 
Whether requiring a defendant charged with 
malicious wounding to undergo surgery to remove a bullet ----------------
from his shoulder to be used as evidence against him 
violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against 
unreasonable searches of the person, when the bullet is 
located approximately one inch beneath the skin, general 
anesthesia will be required during the surgery, the incision 
will be approximately 5 centimeters long, and the surgery 
will be done in a hospital, in a case in which the State has 
proved probable cause exists to believe the bullet is there 
and the defendant had an adversary hearing before a neutral 
judge and an opportunity for appellate review? 
I. Background 
A. Facts and Decisions Below 
Shortly after midnight on July 18, 1982, Ralph 
Watkinson, a storekeeper in Richmond, was closing his 
business for the night when he observed an armed gunman 
approaching him. Watkinson drew his own gun and the two 
exchanged fire. The gunman was hit in the left side of his 
body, and Watkinson was wounded in both legs. The gunman 
fled. Police transported Watkinson to a local emergency 
room; another police car in the area of the store responded 
to a call for resp, who had suffered a gunshot wound in the 
left chest-shoulder area. By chance, resp was taken to the 
~--
same emergency room as Watkinson, whereupon Watkinson -------
the man that shot me!" Resp reported to 
police that he had been shot after being robbed by two men, 
but police investigated the story and found it to be untrue.~ 
Resp was subsequently arrested and charged with 
four felony counts: attempted robbery, use of a firearm in 
an attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and use of a 
firearm in such a wounding. The State filed a motion to 
•. 
compel evidence, seeking to have the bullet in resp's 
shoulder removed to determine whether it had been fired from 
Watkinson's gun. 
There followed a series of court proceedings, in 
which resp was represented by counsel throughout. After 
/ 
hearings, the Va. circuit court granted the State's motion 
to compel, finding that surgery to remove the bullet did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonably intrusive 
search of the person, because the bullet was located one-
half centimeter below the skin and the procedure to remove 
it would be minor, requir~l anesthetic. The 
~a.S.Ct. affirmed, and the federal~C denied resp's requests 
for a writ of habeas corpus and for relief under §1983. 
Resp was taken to the hospital to have the surgery 
performed. During the course of preparation, x-rays were 
taken that revealed that the bullet was deeper than had 
~
originally been thought, and the surgeon consequently 
decided that general anesthesia, instead of a local, should 
be used. Resp's counsel then returned to the circuit court 
requesting a rehearing based on changed circumstances. 
:2. __...-{- • ~ /) 
After taking additional..........- evidence, the court ~
-(~ to its prior ruling. The va.S.ct. affirmed, and~! 
resp moved again in DC for habeas or §1983 relief. After a 
..:.-- --~ 
hearing, the DC (Merhige) granted the relief sought, holding 
that the change in circumstances was material and that 
permitting the surgery would deny resp his Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable intrusions of his person. CA4 
,/ 
substantially affirmed (Phillips and Sprouse), with Judge 
Widener dissenting.l 
B. Relevant Case Law 
~ 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 u.s. 757 (1966), 
the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by 
the nonconsensual withdrawal of a person's blood to 
determine blood alcohol level for purposes of resolving 
charges based on drunken driving. The Court noted that for 
an intrusion beyond the surface of the skin to be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, there must be a "clear 
indication" that it would produce the evidence desired and 
that the evidence was not obtainable otherwise; the Court 
stressed the importance of an "informed, detached, and 
deliberate" determination of probable cause. Id., at 770. 
The Court's decision to permit the extraction of blood was 
premised in part on the facts that such a test is highly 
effective in accurately producing the evidence needed for 
conviction; that the procedure for extraction is commonplace 
and involves "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain"; and that 
1cA4 concluded that habeas relief was not appropriate 
because resp was not challeng i ng~~ cond1 ti o ns of his 
custody. It therefore dismissed the DC's grant of the 
habeas writ. It ruled that resp was entitled tg_ §l2 83 ......... 
relief, however, and ~that he was ~ot_ collaterally estopped ~ l)u,f ~ 
trom raising th issue by the sta t e courts' resof ution of 
the 1ssu ag 1nst 1m bec~s~ he had not received a full and Cf ~-
fair hearing there. The S~te does not appeal this issue ~. ~ 
here. (J--~ 
it was performed in a reasonable manner--by a doctor, in a 
hospital setting, according to accepted medical practices 
that would minimize the risk of injury or infection to the 
defendant. Id., at 771. The Court's holding was narrow: ----. 
it ruled only that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
"minor intrusions under stringently limited conditions"; it 
left open the question of whether more substantial 
intrusions or intrusions under other conditions would be 
constitutional. Id., at 772. 
The other major decision of this Court involving 
the constitutionality of a bodily intrusion against the 
consent purpose of procuring 
evidence 
of the defendant for the 
was ~chin v. California, 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 11.61 
a.. There, the Court ruled that the defendant's rights had been ~~ 
violated by the actions of police in unlawfully entering his~ 
house and bedroom; attempting to remove capsules from the C:.~ 
defendant's mouth after observing him swallow them, 
assaulting and battering him in the process; and 
transporting him to a hospital against his will to have his 
stomach pumped and the capsules thus revealed. The Court 
did not base its decision on Fourth Amendment grounds, 
however, but on the fact that the searches and seizures had 
been conducted without either a warrant or consent and that 
the entire course of events was so shocking as to violate 
defendant's rights to due process of law. Id., at 172. 
Although quite a few state courts have addressed 
the question, only one CA besides the court below has ruled 
on the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of surgery 
to remove a bullet needed for evidence. In that case, 
United States v. Crowder, 543 F. 2d 312 (CADC 1976) , cer t. --
denied, 429 u.s. 1069 (1967), CADC ruled en bane that the 
defendant in a murder case had not been deprived of his 
--:::::::r 
Fourth Amendment rights by the surgical removal of a bullet 
------------·~ 
located just under the skin of his arm, to produce evidence 
..._____ ~· --......-.~ -'--
that would show he had been shot by the same gun used to 
kill the murder victim. The court based its decision on the 
following factors: (1) that the evidence was relevant, 
otherwise unobtainable, and there was probable cause to 
believe the surgery would produce the evidence: (2) the 
. / , d b k' d operation was minor an performed y a s Illed surgeon un er 
circumstances in which all possible medical precautions had 
~ been taken so that the risks to the defendant were minimal: -v h . ( 3) the defendant had a pre-operation adversary ear Ing at 
which he was represented by counsel: and (4) the defendant 
was given a chance for appellate review before the operation 
was performed. The DC had ruled that the bullet was located 
just under the skin of the arm, that removal would not 
affect any nerves, and that the operation could be performed 
._./' 
using a local anesthetic: the same was not true of another 
bullet located in the defendant's thigh, because it was 
lodged more deeply and the DC had found that removal might 
impair the leg's function. A dissent disagreed with the 
majority's holding, in part because it contended that 
procuring the bullet and finding that it was fired from the 
. . 
.. 
murder weapon could have proved no more than that the 
defendant was present at the scene of the crime, a fact that 
was not disputed at trial. 
II. Discussion 
As you noted in your memo to the file, the legal ------..., 
question in this case is very difficult to pin down. State 
cases following Schmerber, as well as the CADC, all view the ~f-
c~ 
issue of the reasonableness of a bodily intrusion as~
depending on the facts of each case, such as how deep th~~,4 
incision must be, how close the bullet is to vital organs, ~ 
whether a general or local anesthetic is required, and what ~ 
The ./1w. are the foreseeable risks of trauma to the defendant. 
removal of a bullet is an inherently more complicated 
procedure than a blood test, requiring the services of a 
surgeon in a hospital setting. Thus, detailed advance 
planning is required in these cases, and rarely at issue are 
the factors that Schmerber was most concerned about: 
whether probable cause exists to believe that the procedure 
will produce the item of evidence desired: whether probable 
cause has been determined by a neutral and detached 
magistrate: and whether the procedure will be performed in a 
reasonable manner--by a doctor, in a hospital, observing 
accepted medical practices. Because of the infinitely 
variable nature of the factors that must be considered in 
each case, and the consequent difficulty in formulating a 
u.k 
general rule of law, the Court should probably not have ~ 
granted cert in this case. Since the case is here, however, ~ 
... ~~ 
the Court must decide whether this particular 1ntrus1on 1s ;_.n 
,J?Y~~ 
reasonable. ~ 
In another Fourth Amendment context, the Court has 
stated the general truth that "the permissibility of a 
u \' 
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing .....___ __ ~ 
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 
~elaware v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 648, 654 (1979). Applying that 
standard here, it is clear that an accused, who has not yet ?~ 
been convicted of a crime, has a great interest in not ,a.,,L~ 
lightly being compelled to submit to general anesthesia and 
c~ 
a more than superficial surgery upon his body. On the other · ~ 
hand, the State has a compelling governmental interest in~ 
prosecuting crimes of the sort in which it believes resp was 
involved. A useful way to analyze this case, therefore, may 
be to look first at the circumstances relevant to the 
surgery and its impact upon the resp, followed by an 
examination of the State's interest in, and need for, the 
evidence that could be revealed by the surgery. 
A. The Surgery and Its Impact 
In Schmerber, the Court declined to make any 
sweeping statements about the outer limits of what the 
Fourth Amendment permits in the area of bodily intrusions. 
In permitting the blood test, however, it did rely on the 
·' 
facts that the test is commonplace and that it involves 
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. Resp cites this as 
proof that the surgery requested by the State here is 
unconstitutional. 
There is no question that the surgery required 
here involves considerably more risk, trauma, and pain to 
the patient than did the blood test in Schmerber. I do not 
read Schmerber, however, as requiring the conclusion that 
this surgery is an unconstitutional intrusion. Even though 
the Court cautioned there that greater intrusions might not 
be constitutional, it carefully stated that it reached its 
judgment "only on the facts of the present record," and that 
it held only "that the Constitution does not forbid the 
States minor intrusions into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions," 384 u.s., at 772. The 
Court did not purport to decide the constitutionality of 
other types of intrusions under other circumstances. Here, 
as in Schmerber, the conditions under which the surgery will 
be performed will be "stringently limited" in that the 
operation will be performed by a doctor, in a hospital, 
pursuant to standard medical practices. The only question ~ 
remaining as to the proposed surgery, therefore, is wheth
l--7,.., ~-
it is so major that it violates the Fourth Amendment. That~~ 
question is not answered by Schmerber. ~~ 
Analogies to other Fourth Amendment cases from 
this Court are also unhelpful, as the Schmerber Court noted, 
see id., at 769, because intrusions beyond the surface of 
the skin involve concerns of privacy and human dignity that 
~---- ··--=:._ -- ------ ·--------
are not implicated by the more usual searches of the person. 
Petr and resp each analyze the relevant state court cases 
and attempt to draw from them some overriding principle that 
will determine when an intrusion becomes too great. As 
discussed above, however, such an overriding principle 
cannot exist because the reasonableness of an intrusion will 
vary infinitely and materially from case to case. Even 
cases of a particular category of intrusion, such as those 
involving the surgical removal of a bullet, do not lend 
themselves to a more manageable standard because the depth 
of the bullet, its proximity to vital organs, the health of 
the defendant, and other such crucial facts cannot either be 
predicted or categorized. 
CA4 and the DC attempt to separate the medical 
determination of whether a particular type of surgery is 
"minor" under the circumstances,. from the legal 
determination of whether the surgery is minor enough to be 
constitutionally permissible. (See CA4's decision, Petn 
App. at 43.) Those courts are correct to the extent that a 
medical determination of that sort is, of course, not made 
with a constitutional standard in mind. By the same token, 
however, once a court concludes (1) that the proper legal 
precautions of ensuring that probable cause exists and that 
the deft has had an adversary hearing and appellate review 
have been taken, and (2) that the surgery will be conducted ~ 
in a reasonable and medically safe manner, the only question cg 
remaining is the determination of how relatively major or 
minor the intrusion will be. Although a court making this 
decison must bear the Fourth Amendment in mind, it may 
properly consider the question only after being informed of 
the medical evaluation of how risky or traumatic the 
procedure will be. Thus, I believe CA4 and the DC erred in 
r--- __ . 
putting aside as irrelevant the medical determination that 
the surgery is "minor." 
B. The State's Interest in the Evidence 
In analysing the State's need for the evidence to 
accomplish its governmental purpose of bringing a felon to 
justice, it is somewhat helpful once again to look at 
Schmerber. One of the primary reasons given there for 
permitting the blood test was that such a test is highly 
effective in producing the evidence that is needed for 
conviction: the defendant's blood alcohol level. By 
comparison, in this case the same degree of effectiveness is 
lacking, because although there is no question that the 
surgery would produce the bullet, there is substantial 
question whether the evidence needed for conviction could be 
deduced from tests on the bullet after it was removed. The 
State does not contest resp' s contention that ballistics 
tests are sufficiently unreliable that it may well be 
impossible to tell from examining the bullet that it was 
fired from Watkinson's gun--even if the bullet were in ,._ ______ ~
perfect shape. Moreover, there is considerable doubt here 
about what the bullet's condition is, because it may have 
been damaged by entry or by having been exposed for over two 
years to the apparently corrosive effect of bodily fluids. 
Therefore, production of the bullet may be far from '----_____,____---__ ........ _  _......._____._ __ -
conclusive _as to resp's guilt. ~~~~vi/§ I 
- -- '--"-----....___-~ ·~ ~~~ ~-
Furthermore, casting additional doubt on the value 
of the bullet as evidence is the fact that the SJ:ate _has 
what is evidently a competent eyewitness identification of 
resp made by Watkinson shortly after the shooting occurred. 
Therefore, even assuming that examination of the bullet 
would reveal that it came from Watkinson's gun, that piece 
of evidence may well be unnecessary to convict resp. 
The Schmerber Court held that "[t]he interests in 
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment 
protects forbid any such [bodily] intrusion on the mere 
chance that desired evidence might be obtained." 384 u.s., 
at 760-770 (emphasis added) • Although this might be 
construed as requiring, in this case, only a certainty that 
the bullet exists and may be obtained by the proposed 
surgical procedure, I believe a better way to rea~ it, in ~ 
light of the facts of Schmerber, is to require that t~ ~-f 
- - ----------- --
evidence be needed for conviction, as was the blood test in ~ 
Schmerber, and that there be a reasonable chance that t~&.4 
~­
evidence needed for conviction will be obtained by employing  
the procedure. Here, the State should be required to show a ~ 
reasonable likelihood that tests will demonstrate that the 
bullet was fired from Watkinson's gun, not just a likelihood 
that the bullet exists. 
c. Weighing Both Sides of the Question 
In the end, the Court must simply weigh all of the 
factors supporting the State's need for the evidence versus 
the complexity of the procedure and its risk to the resp, 
and make a judgment about the reasonableness of the surgery. 
Recognizing that my judgment may very well differ from 
yours, I conclude on balance that the surgery proposed here 
is not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although 
----------------------------------~--------~--there are always some risks involved with general 
anesthesia, certainly the resp is an unusually good risk, 
given his previous successful exposure to such anesthetics 
and his youth and good health. The incision required is a 
fairly deep one, more than the superficial incision involved ..........-----
in Crowder or the pinprick in Schmerber; it involves some 
risk of damage to nerves and muscles. On the other hand, 
the general anesthetic apparently substantially decreases 
the chance that any such damage will occur, because the 
muscles will be relaxed. Also in favor of a conclusion that 
the intrusion is reasonable is the fact that the bullet is 
Based on these medical ) 
is close, but I would 
probably lean toward a conclusion that the operation was not 
located near no vital organs. 







In the end, however, I am persuaded that this 
C--~ 
operation should not be permitted because the State has not 
~ -------- _, ----
demonstrated that removal of the bullet would be likely to 
-----------------------~--~--~--------------- -enable it to obtain a conviction it would not otherwise be 
able to obtain. As noted above, the State already has a ---competent and convincing eyewitness identification of resp 
by Watkinson. Moreover, there is a substantial chance that 
tests on the bullet will be inconclusive as to whether the 
bullet was fired from Watkinson's gun. Weighing these 
factors is, for me, enough to shift the balance to a 
conclusion that requiring the operation would be 
unreasonable. 
Conclusion 
Because the question of the reasonableness of a 
bodily intrusion by Fourth Amendment standards necessarily 
depends on the facts of each case, and because the facts of 
these cases are so infinitely variable, it is d iff icul t to ---ascertain an overriding legal principle that will apply 
~------------------~--------------
across the board. Schmerbe~provides some help, although it 
is not dispositive, because the Court there strictly limited 
"""'-------\ 
its judgment to the case's facts. Looking to the general 
principle of Fourth Amendment law that the permissibility of 
a law enforcement procedure should be judged by balancing 
the intrusion to the person against its promotion of 










substantial intrusion, but not one that I would consider to 
be unreasonable. Combined with the likelihood that tests on 
the bullet would be inconclusive as to resp's guilt and the 
lack of need for those tests, given the eyewitness 
identification of resp as the assailant, I believe the 
balance tips against permitting the surgery. Therefore, I 
recommend that you vote to affirm. 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upumt Qjqurt qf lift ~ttb .llhttts 
--~· ~. <!f. 211~"'' 
January 17, 1985 
Re: 83-1334 - Winston and Davis v. Lee 
Dear Bill: 
My reaction to your draft was pretty much the 
same as that expressed by Sandra. Moreover, in this 
particular case I was strongly influenced by my 
belief that the prosecutor really doesn't need the 
bullet anyway. For the time being, therefore, I 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.tnvrtutt Qf1t1td of tqt ~ittb .ihdt.l¥ 
._ulfittgton, ~. Of. 211t?~.;J 
January 17, 1985 
No. 83-1334 Winston and Davis v. Lee 
Dear Bill, 
At Conference, I voted to affirm in this case, but 
your sweeping approach to it gives me pause. I had thought 
Schmerber gave us all the tests and guidelines we needed to 
balance the state's interest against those of the defendant 
;on the facts of this case. Your draft appears to adopt a 
~ new strict four-part test, including an adversarial 
proceeding and appellate review, in every instance of any 
violation of a person's bodily integrity. I am unwilling to 
follow more than a reasonable balancing approach, taking 
into account the crucial factors in this particular case. 
Moreover, I am also concerned with the apparent expansion of 
the characterization of the Fourth Amendment protections as 
outlined in Part II of the opinion. 
For now, I will wait for possible further writing. 
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.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Sandra, 
January 18, 1985 
No. 83-1334 
Winston v. Lee 
I will be circulating a revised 
draft that I hope will accommodate you. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMB E R S OF" 
.l'ttpTtmt <q(tUff: ltf tift }tnitta .UdtS' 
Jlultinghm. ~. <q. 20~,.~ 
..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE January 24, 1985 
83-1334 - Winston and Davis v. Lee 
Dear Bill, 
I doubt that I can join your opinion in 
its present form and will very likely concur 
on much narrower grounds. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Brennan 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1334 
ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF AND AUBREY 
M. DAVIS, JR., PETITIONERS v. 
RUDOLPH LEE, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[February - , 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), held inter 
alia that a State may, over the suspect's protest, have a phy-
sician extract blood from a person suspected of drunk driving 
without violation of the suspect's right secured by the Fourth 
Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable searches 
and seizures. However, Schmerber cautioned "That we to-
day hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States 
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently 
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." 
I d., at 772. In this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia 
seeks to compel the respondent Rudolph Lee, who is sus-
pected of attempting to commit armed robbery, to undergo a 
surgical procedure under a general anesthetic for removal of 
a bullet lodged in his chest. The Commonwealth alleges that 
the bullet will provide evidence of respondent's guilt or inno-
cence. We conclude that the procedure sought here is an ex-
ample of the "more substantial intrusion" cautioned against in 
Schmerber, and -eeas9qUQRtl~ hold that to permit the proce-
dure would violate respondent's right to be "secure in [his] 
person" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
ILU.s ~~ cl..x-~ ~ 
(_~~~ 
~ ~~~/ ~ r be-L.~ 
f-o~~~~~· 
(~J-ru- ~. ) 
2 
83-1334-0PINION 
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I 
A 
At approximately 1:00 a. m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph E. 
Watkinson was closing his shop for the night. As he was 
locking the door, he observed someone armed with a gun 
coming toward him from across tbe street. Watkinson was 
also armed and when he drew his gun, the other person told 
him to freeze. Watkinson then fired at the other person, 
who returned his fire. Watkinson was hit in the legs, while 
the other individual, who appeared to be wounded in his left 
side, ran from the scene. The police arrived on the scene 
shortly thereafter, and .Watkinson was taken by ambulance 
to the emergency room of the Medical College of Virginia 
(MCV) Hospital. 
Approximately 20 minutes later, police officers responding 
to another call found respondent eight blocks from where the 
earlier shooting occurred. Respondent was suffering from a 
gunshot wound to his left chest area and told the police that 
he had been shot when two individuals attempted to rob him. 
An ambulance took respondent to the MCV Hospital. 
Watkinson was still in the MCV emergency room and, when 
respondent entered that room, said "[T]hat's the man that 
shot me." App. 14. After an investigation, the police 
decided that respondent's story of having been himself the 
victim of a robbery was untrue and charged respondent with 
attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of 
using a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
B 
The Commonwealth shortly thereafter moved in State 
court for an order directing respondent to undergo surgery to 
remove an object thought to be a bullet lodged under his left 
collarbone. The court conducted several evidentiary hear-
ings on the motion. At the first hearing, the Common-
wealth's expert testified that the surgical procedure would 
take 45 minutes and would involve a three to four percent 
83-1334-0PINION 
WINSTON v. LEE 3 
chance of temporary nerve damage, a one percent chance of 
permanent nerve damage, and a one-tenth of one percent 
chance of death. At the second hearing, the expert testified 
that on re-examination of respondent, he discovered that the 
bullet was not "back inside close to the arteries," App. 52, as 
he originally had thought. Instead, he now believed the bul-
let to be located "just beneath the skin." App. 57. He testi-
fied that the surgery would require an incision of only one 
and one-half centimeters (slightly more than one-half inch), 
could be performed under local anesthesia, and would result 
in "no danger on the basis that there's no general anesthesia 
employed." App. 51. 
The state trial judge granted the motion to compel sur-
gery. Respondent petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court 
for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of habeas corpus, both 
of which were denied. Respondent then brought an action in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia to enjoin the pending operation on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds. The court refused to issue a preliminary in-
junction, holding that respondent's cause had little likelihood 
of success on the merits. 551 F. Supp. 247, 247-253 (1982). 1 
On October 18, 1982, just before the surgery was sched-
uled, the surgeon ordered that X-rays be taken of respond-
ent's chest. The X-rays revealed that the bullet was in fact 
lodged two and one-half to three centimeters (approximately 
one inch) deep in muscular tissue in respondent's chest, sub-
stantially deeper than had been thought when the state court 
granted the motion to compel surgery. The surgeon now be-
lieved that a general anesthetic would be desirable for medi-
cal reasons. 
' Respondent's action in the District Court was styled as a petition for 
habeas corpus and an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a preliminary in-
junction. Because the District Court denied the relief sought, it found it 
unnecessary to consider whether res judicata, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U. S. 90 (1980), would bar consideration of the§ 1983 claim. 551 F. Supp., 
at 252, n. 4. 
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Respondent moved the state trial court for a rehearing 
based on the new evidence. After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the state trial court denied the rehearing and the 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Respondent then re-
turned to federal court, where he moved to alter or amend 
the judgment previously entered against him. After an evi-
dentiary hearing, the District Court enjoined the threatened 
surgery. 551 F. Supp. 247, 253-261 (ED Va. 1982) (supple-
mental opinion). 2 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 717 F. 2d 888 (1984). 3 We 
2 Respondent had moved to reopen the petition for habeas corpus, as 
well as to alter or amend the judgment. Petitioner moved to dismiss the 
petition for habeas on the ground that respondent was not at that time "in 
custody" for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The District Court rejected 
this contention, holding that habeas was available because petitioner was 
objecting to a future custody that would take place when the operation was 
to be performed. 247 F. Supp., at 257-259. The Court of Appeals held 
that respondent's claim was cognizable only under § 1983. 717 F . 2d, at 
893 (1983). Respondent has not cross-petitioned for review of this hold-
ing, and it is therefore not before us. 
3 The Fourth Circuit held that Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), 
did not bar respondent's attempt to relitigate in federal court the same 
Fourth Amendment issues previously litigated in state court. The court 
agreed with the District Court's conclusion, see 551 F . Supp., at 258-259, 
that respondent had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the 
state trial court. 717 F. 2d, at 895-899. Respondent filed his motion for 
rehearing in state court on October 18, the day he was informed of the 
changed circumstances regarding the removal of the bullet. On October 
19, the state court ordered an evidentiary hearing to be held on October 21. 
The Court of Appeals was "satisfied from the record that counsel was not 
able, despite obviously diligent effort, to obtain an independent review of 
the medical record by outside physicians nor was he able to consult with 
the independent expert in anesthesiology in order to prepare a presenta-
tion on the risks of general anesthesia." !d., at 897. Yet, despite the cru-
cial nature of the medical evidence, the state court refused to grant 
respondent's repeated request for a continuance. Because "[t]he arbitrary 
truncation of preparation time deprived [respondent] of a fair opportunity 
to determine the crucial factors relevant to his claim and to obtain inde-
pendent expert witnesses to testify about these factors," 717 F . 2d, at 
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granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), to consider 
whether a State may consistently with the Fourth Amend-
ment compel a suspect to undergo surgery of this kind in a 
search for evidence of a crime. 
II 
The Fourth Amendment protects "expectations of pri-
vacy," see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1968)-the 
individual's legitimate expectations that in certain places and 
at certain times he has "the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Putting to one side the 
procedural protections of the warrant requirement, the 
Fourth Amendment generally protects the "security" of "per-
sons, houses, papers and effects" against official intrusions up 
to the point where the community's need for evidence sur-
mounts a specified standard, ordinarily "probable cause." 
Beyond this point, it is ordinarily justifiable for the commu-
nity to demand that the individual give up some part of his 
interest in privacy and security to advance the communit 's 
vital interests in law enforcement; such ~s generally 
"reasonable" in the Amendment's terms. 
A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for 
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privac and 
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may e "unrea-
sonable" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime. Cf. 
Tennessee v. Garner,-- U.S.--,-- (1985) (holding 
that "seizure" by means of deadly force may not be justifiable 
despite the presence of probable cause sufficient to permit 
arrest). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), 
we addressed a claim that the State had breached the Fourth 
Amendment's protection of the "right of the people to be 
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches 
898-899, the Court of Appeals refused to grant preclusive effect to the 
state court's findings. Petitioner does not challenge this ruling. 
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and seizures" (emphasis added) when it compelled an individ-
ual suspected of drunk driving to undergo a blood test. 
Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital while receiving 
treatment for injuries suffered when the automobile he was 
driving struck a tree. Id., at 758. Despite Schmerber's 
objection, a police officer at the hospital had directed a physi-
cian to take a blood sample from him. Schmerber subse-
quently objected to the introduction at trial of evidence ob-
tained as a result of the blood test. 
The authorities in Schmerber clearly had probable cause to 
~  believe that~ had been driving while intoxicated, id., at 
L~ - 768, and to believe that a blood test would provide evidence 
that was exceptionally probative in confirming this belief. 
I d., at 770. Because the case fell within the exigent circum-
stances exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant 
was necessary. Id. The search was not more intrusive 
than reasonably necessary to accomplish its goals. N onethe-
less, Schmerber argued that the Fourth Amendment prohib-
ited the authorities from intruding into his body to extract 
the blood that was needed as evidence. 
Schmerber noted that "[t]he overriding function of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dig-
nity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." I d., at 
767. Citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949), and 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we observed that these 
values were "basic to a free society." We also noted that 
"[b]ecause we are dealing with intrusions into the human 
body rather than with state interferences with property rela-
~ _ ti~nships or private papers-'houses, papers, and effects'-
~ we wrjte on a clean slate." 384 U. S., at 767-768. The in-
trusion perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and 
deep-rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court recog-
nized that Fourth Amendment analysis thus required a dis-
cerning inquiry into the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether the intrusion was justifiable. The Fourth Amend-
ment neither forbids nor permits all such intrusions; rather, 
-,h.J... 
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the Amendment's "proper function is to constrain, not 
against all intrusions as such, but against those intrusions 
which are not· justified in the circumstances, or which are 
made in an improper manner." /d., at 768. 
The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin 
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's 
interests in privacy and security are weighed against soci-
ety's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case, 
the question whether the community's need for evidence out-
weighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate 
one admitting of few categorical answers. We believe that 
Schmerber, however, provides the appropriate framework of 
analysis for such cases. 
Schmerber recognized that the ordinary requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment would be the threshold requirements 
for conducting this kind of surgical search and seizure. We 
noted the importance of probable cause. Id., at 768-769. 
And we pointed out that "[s]earch warrants are ordinarily 
required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emer-
gency, no less could be required where intrusions into the 
human body are concerned .... The importance of informed, 
detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether 
or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt 
is indisputable and great." I d., at 770. 
Beyond these standards, Schmerbers inquiry considered a 
number of other factors in determining the "reasonableness" 
of the blood test. A crucial factor in analyzing the rna i-
tude of the intrusion in Schmerber. t e extent to which the 
procedure may threaten the safet or health of the individ-
ual. "[F]or most people [a blood test] involves virtually no 
risk, trauma, or pain." Ibid. Moreover, all reasonable 
medical precautions were taken and no unusual or untested 
procedures were employed in Schmerber; "the procedure was 
performed by medical technicians in a hospital environment 
according to accepted medical practices." Ibid. Notwith-
standing the existence of probable cause, a search for evi-
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dence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it endangers the life 
or health of the suspect. 4 
Another factor is the extent of intrusion upon the individ-
ual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity. Intruding into an individual's living room, see Payton 
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), eavesdropping upon an 
individual's telephone conversations, see Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1968), or forcing an individual to 
accompany police officers to the police station, see Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), typically do not injure the 
physical person of the individual. Such intrusions do, how-
ever, damage the individual's sense of personal privacy and 
security and are thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's 
dictates. In noting that a blood test was "a commonplace in 
these days of periodic physical examinations," 384 U. S., at 
771, Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood 
tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an 
individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity.5 
'Numerous courts have recognized the crucial importance of this factor. 
See, e. g., Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 823, 510 S. W. 2d 879, 882 (1974) 
(refusing to order surgery because of medical risk); People v. Smith, 80 
Misc. 2d 210, 362 N. Y.S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (same); State v. Allen, 277 
S. C. 595, 291 S. E. 2d 459 (1982) (same); see also Lee v. Winston, 717 F . 
2d 888, 900 (CA4 1983); id., at 905-908 (Widener, J ., dissenting); United 
States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d 312, 316 (1976) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v. Overstreet, 551 
S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 1977) (en bane). See generally Note, 68 Marquette 
L. Rev. 130, 135 (1984) (discussing cases involving bodily intrusions); Note, 
60 Notre Dame Law Review 149, 152-156 (1984) (same); Note, 55 Texas L. 
Rev. 147 (1976) (same). 
5 See also Sehmerber, 384 U.S, at 771 ("The blood test has become rou-
tine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military 
service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges re-
quire such tests before permitting entrance and literally millions of us have 
voluntarily gone through the same, though a longer, routine in becoming 
blood donors") (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 436 (1957)). 
The degree of intrusion in Sehmerber was minimized as well by the fact 
that a blood test "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," 384 U. S., at 
771, and by the fact that the blood test was conducted "in a hospital envi-
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Weighed against these individual interests is the communi-
ty's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or 
innocence. This interest is of course of great importance. 
We noted in Schmerber that a blood test is "a highly effective 
means of determining the degree to which a person is under 
the influence of alcohol." !d., at 771. Moreover, there was 
"a clear indication that in fact [desired] evidence [would] 
be found" if the blood test were undertaken. I d., at 770. 
Especially given the difficulty of proving drunkenness by 
other means, these considerations showed that results of the 
blood test were of vital importance if the State were to en-
force its drunk driving laws. In Schmerber, we concluded 
that this State interest was sufficient to justify the intrusion, 
and the compelled blood test was thus "reasonable" for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. 
III 
Applying the Schmerber balancin,g test in this case, we be-
lieve that the Court of Appears reacl?e(f the correct result. 
The Commonwealth plainly had probable cause to conduct 
the search. In addition, all parties apparently agree that 
respondent has had a full measure of procedural protections 
and has been able fully to litigate the difficult medical and 
legal questions necessarily involved in analyzing the reason-
ableness of a surgical incision of this magnitude. 6 Our 
ronment according to accepted medical practices." I d. As such, the pro-
cedure in Schmerber contrasted sharply with the practice in Rochin v. 
California, 342 U. S. 165 (date), in which police officers broke into a sus-
pect's room, attempted to extract narcotics capsules he had put into his 
mouth, took him to a hospital, and directed that an emetic be administered 
to induce vomiting. Id., at 166. Rochin, recognizing the individual's in-
terest in "human dignity," id., at 174, held the search and seizure uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process Clause. 
6 Because the State has afforded respondent the benefit of a full adver-
sary presentation and appellate review, we do not reach the question 
whether the State may compel a suspect to undergo a surgical search of 
this magnitude for evidence absent such special procedural protections. 
Cf. United States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d 
.. 
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inquiry therefore must ~s OE_ t!!e ex~t o!Jhj "ntrusion on 
respondent's privacy interestSarra-orltliestate need for the 
evidence. 
The threats to the health or safety of respondent posed by 
the surgery are the subject of sharp dispute between the par-
ties. Before the new revelations of October 18, the District 
Court found that the procedure could be carried out "with 
virtually no risk to [respondent]." 551 F. Supp., at 252. On 
rehearing, however, with new evidence before it, the District 
Court held that "the risks previously involved have increased 
in magnitude even as new risks are being added." I d., at 
260. 
The Court of Appeals examined the medical evidence in the 
record and found that respondent would suffer some risks 
associated with the surgical procedure. 7 One surgeon had 
testified that the difficulty of discovering the exact location of 
the bullet "could require extensive probing and retracting of 
the muscle tissue," carrying with it "the concomitant risks of 
injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood 
vessels and other tissue in the chest and pleural cavity." 717 
F. 2d, at 900. The court further noted that "the greater 
intrusion and the larger incisions increase the risks of infec-
tion." Ibid. Moreover, there was conflict in the testimony 
concerning the nature and the scope of the operation. One 
surgeon stated that it would take 15-20 minutes, while 
another predicted the procedure could take up to two and 
one-half hours. Ibid. The court properly took the resulting 
uncertainty about the medical risks into account. 8 
312, 316 (1976) (en bane) , cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v. 
Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, - , 453 A. 2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1982). 
7 The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that "the specific physical 
risks from putting [respondent] under general anesthesia may be consid-
ered minimal." 717 F . 2d, at 900. Testimony had shown that "the gen-
eral risks of harm or death~ general anesthesia are quite low, and that 1'(" 
[respondent] was in the statistical group of persons with the lowest risk of 
injury from general anesthesia." Ibid. 
8 One expert testified that this would be "minor" surgery. See App. 
99. The question whether the surgery is to be characterized in medical 
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Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed 
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of 
a general anesthetic, would be a severe intrusion on respond-
ent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. When con-
ducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring 
general anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. 
In such a case, the surgeon is carrying out the patient's own 
will concerning the patient's body and the patient's right to 
privacy is therefore preserved. In this case, however, the 
Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth proposes to 
take control of respondent's body, to "drug the citizen-not 
yet convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and bar-
biturates into a state of unconsciousness," 717 F. 2d, ~901, u _ 
and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of ~rime. ~ ~ ~> 
This kind of surgery, which involves a virtually total divest- J ~ 
ment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing ~ ki~ 
beneath his skin, is an extremely severe intrusion. 
The other part of tlie oa ce co cerns t e Common-
wealth's need to intrude into respondent's body to retrieve 
the bullet. The Commonwealth claims to need the bullet to 
demonstrate that it was fired from Watkinson's gun, which in 
turn would show that respondent was the robber who con-
fronted Watkinson. However, although we recognize the 
difficulty of making determinations in advance as to the 
strength of the case against respondent, petitioners' asser-
tions of a compelling need for the bullet are hardly persua-
sive. The very circumstances relied on in this case to dem-
onstrate probable cause to believe that evidence will be found 
tend to vitiate the Commonwealth's need to compel respond-
ent to undergo surgery. The Commonwealth has available 
terms as "major" or "minor" is not controlling. We agree with the Court 
of Appeals and the District Court in this case that "there is no reason to 
suppose that the definition of a medical term of art should coincide with the 
parameters of a constitutional standard." 551 F. Supp., at 160 (quoted at 
717 F. 2d, at 901); accord, State v. Overstreet, 551 S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 
1977). This does not mean that the application of medical concepts in such 
cases is to be ignored. However, no specific medical categorization can 
control the multi-faceted legal inquiry that the court must undertake. 
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substantial additional evidence that respondent was the indi-
vidual who accosted Watkinson on the night of the robbery. 
No party in this case suggests that Watkinson's entirely 
spontaneous identification of respondent at the hospital 
would be inadmissible. In addition, petitioners can no doubt 
prove that Watkinson was found a few blocks from 
Watkinson's store shortly after the incident took place. And 
the Commonwealth can certainly show that the location of 
the bullet (under respondent's left collarbone) seems to corre-
late with Watkinson's report that the robber "jerked" to the 
--- left. App. 13. The fact that the Commonwealth has avail-
able~stanthiDevidence of the origin of the bullet 
~ restricts the need for the State to compel respondent 
to undergo the contemplated surgery. 9 
In weighin the various factors in this case, we therefore 
reach e same conclusion as t e courts below. The opera-
tion sough will m ru e su s antla y on espondent's pro-
tected interests. The medical risks of the operation, al-
thou h pparently not extremely severe, are a subject of 
conside ble dispute; the very uncertainty militates against 
9 There are also some questions concerning the probative value of the 
bullet, even if it could be retrieved. The evidentiary value of the bullet 
depends on a comparison between markings, if any, on the bullet in re-
spondent's shoulder and markings, if any, found on a test bullet that_t_h.;...e --t-
police could fire from Watkinson's gun. However, the record su rts 
some doubt whether this kind of comparison is possibl~ IS IS ec 
the bullet's markings may have been corroded in the time that the bullet 
has been in respondent's shoulder, thus making it useless for comparison 
purposes. See 717 F . 2d, at 901, n. 15. In addition, respondent argues 
that any given gun may be incapable of firing bullets that have a consistent 
set of markings. SeeR. J. Joling, An Overview of Firearms Identification 
Evidence for Attorneys I: Salient Features of Firearms Evidence, 26 J. 
Forensic Sci. 153, 154 (1981). The record is devoid of any evidence that 
the police have attempted to test-fire Watkinson's gun, and there thus 
remains the additional possibility that a comparison of bullets is impossible 
because Watkinson's gun does not consistently fire bullets with the same 
markings. However, because the courts below made no findings on this 
point, we hesitate to give it significant weight in our analysis. 
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finding the operation to be "reasonable." In addition, the 
intrusion on respondent's privacy interests entailed by the 
operation can only be characterized as extremel?'Severe. 
On the other hand, although the bullet may turn out to be 
useful to the Commonwealth in prosecuting respondent, the 
Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a com ellin need ~ ~ 
for it. We believe that m these · c ances t e om~
wealth has failed to demonstrate that it would be "reason-
able" under the terms of the Fourth Amendment to search 
for evidence of this crime by means of the contemplated 
surgery. 
IV 
The Fourth Amendment is a vital safeguard of the right of 
the citizen to be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sions into any area in which he has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Where the Court has found a lesser expectation 
of privacy, see, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), or where 
the search involves a minimal intrusion on privacy interests, 
see, e. g., United States v. Hensley, -- U. S. -- (1985); 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210-211 (1979); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975); 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has held that the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections are correspondingly less stringent. Con-
versely, however, the Fourth Amendment's command that 
searches be "reasonable" requires that when the State seeks 
to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a sig-
nificantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial 
justification is required to make the search "reasonable." 
Applying these principles, we hold that the proposed search 
in this case would be "unreasonable" under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Affirmed. 
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Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 02/15/85 
M'F:MORANOUM 
TO: Lynda DATE: Feb. 15, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-1334 Winston v. Lee 
As you will see, I have substantially reframed 
your draft of a letter to Justice Brennan, but relied on the 
basic points that you so correctly make. 
Pleas~ feel free to improve the language in my 
dictated draft. I would like to get this circulated as 
promotly as we can before other. people ioin Bill Brennan. I 
know that Elizabeth has required your attention today. Per-
haps we could get this letter out tomorrow, even though it 
is Saturday. For example, you can send material to me by 
having the Marshal's office - that ts the police - use a 
Court car to brinq it down to me at my request, if it should 





JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR. 
Dear Bill: 
.fltJTttntt <!fouri &tf tlrt ~tb' .ftRits 
jlhts frington. ~. <!f. 21T,?)l. ~ 
February 16, 1985 
No. 83-1334 Winston v. Lee 
I was not able until yesterday to read the draft 
op1n1ons that have circulated in this important case. Your 
second draft comes quite close to an opinion that I could 
join. I do have concerns, however, that I outline briefly. 
1. I thought the Court agreed that we would apply 
the Schmerber balancing test, and much of your opinion pur-
ports to do this. It seems to me, however, that certainly 
language in the opinion will be read as imposing a substan-
tially heavier burden on the state whenever a surgical pro-
cedure is involved - a burden shifting that can be read as 
departing from the basic balancing that is the centerpiece 
of Schmerber. 
For example, on p. 1 you state that "the procedure 
sought here is an example of the 'more substantial intru-
sion' cautioned against in Schmerber, and consequently [we] 
hold that to permit the procedure would violate respondent's 
[Fourth Amendment rights] •••• • I am afraid this lan-
guage could be read - in light of other language in the 
opinion - as indicating a blanket disapproval of almost any 
surgical procedure or at least a strong presumption against 
its validity. This would be a departure from the Schmerber 
requirement that a Court should consider all of the relevant 
facts and circumstances. 
With respect to this sentence on p. 1, deleting 
the word "consequently" would eliminate the implication that 
a surgical procedure - any surgical procedure - necessarily 
imposes a different balancing than Schmerber. 
2. Your opinion emphasizes that the procedure is 
conducted without the respondent's consent. But will this 
not always be true? Otherwise, there would be no case. 
One interesting point in this case is that it 
could be argued, I suppose, that respondent's strong opposi-
tion prompted the evidence that a general anesthetic was 
desirable simply to make certain that respondent could be 
counted on to remain perfectly still during the procedure. 
2. 
3. In several places in your opinion language is 
modified by the use of "extremely" and "severely" (e.g., p. 
11, lines 2, 17~ p. 12, line 12~ p. 13, line 2). use of 
this language contributes to what seems to me to be the 
overall tone of the opinion that ~surgical procedure 
places the case in a different context from the Schmerber 
balancing of all relevant facts and circumstances. 
In sum, Bill, I view this as an extremely close 
case. If the State of Virginia had shown a compelling need 
for the evidence, the balance very well could have shifted 
the other way. It does not seem to me that your opinion 
emphasizes sufficiently that the issue in a case of this 
kind necessarily involves a weighing of all relevant facts 
and circumstances. The term "surgical procedure" embraces 
everything that may require the use of a surgical instru-
ment. The term would embrace, for example, everything from 
removing a small splinter to the type of surgery I experi-
enced out at Mayo. I think my concerns expressed above 
would require only the most modest changes in your opinion. 
If you are inclined to make them, I will be happy to join. 
If not, I probably will write separately. 
Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
l'uvrtnu <lJltmt ltf tlft ~b .itatu 
'lla.sfringhm, ~. OJ. 21l,;i){.~ 
CHAMI!SE:RS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Re: No. 83-1334-Winston v. Lee 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
, .. . .. 





.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Lewis: 
February 19, 1985 
No. 83-1334 -- Winston v. Lee 
Thanks for your letter of February 16. I hope that the 
following changes will take care of the issues you raised. Your 
first suggested change will be made in the next draft. 
With respect to your second point, however, I am a little 
less sure what to do. It seems to me that, although use of a 
general anesthetic could become necessary in a case like this 
because of the lack of cooperation of the suspect, this was not 
what happened here. The parties do not seem to argue that this 
was the purpose of the general anesthetic in this case, and the 
Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he new surgeon decided that the 
greater depth of the bullet required the use of general 
anesthesia in the surgery." 717 F.2d, at 891. The testimony of 
the surgeon was that it was up to the surgeon to decide whether 
to use general anesthesia, J.A. 91, and that "it would be safer 
to remove the bullet under general anesthesia," J .A. 83. He 
elaborated on this point at J.A. 91-92 and explained on J.A. 94 
that the pain caused by the operation, even under a local 
anesthetic, may cause a patient to "tighten up," which 
consequently could make the operation "more difficult." Finally, 
at J .A. 102-109, he resisted the suggestion that the general 
anesthetic would be necessary because of respondent's lack of 
cooperation. In the light of all of this, it seems that the 
general anesthetic is necessary here for "purely medical 
reasons," as the opinion suggests on p. 11, line 2. See also p. 
3, last line. Would it resolve your doubts if I added the 
following footnote to the passage on p. 11: "Somewhat different 
issues would be raised if the use of a general anesthetic became 
necessary because of the patient's refusal to cooperate. Cf. 
State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super 25, 453 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 
1982)." 
With respect to your third point, I believe that I can make 
the necessary changes. At the top of p. 11, the language merely 
reports the lower courts' views. I would change this sentence to 
read: "Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed 
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of a 
-2-
general anesthetic, would be an 'extensive' intrusion on 
respondent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. 717 F.2d, at 
900." In the middle of p. 11, I would modify the sentence to 
read: "This kind of surgery involves a virtually total 
divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing 
beneath his skin." On p. 12, I would omit the word "severely." 
On p. 13, I would omit the word "extremely." All of these 
passages relate only to the particular facts of this case, and I 
do not believe that, especially as modified, they suggest that 
all forms of surgery ought to be treated similarly. The current 
draft of the opinion explicitly employs a totality of the 
circumstances "balancing" process. See, e.g., pp. 6, 7, 9, 12. 
I hope that these changes are satisfactory. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~U¥rtnu <qaurt #£ t4t JnUtb ~tab.e' 
JlU'Ifingtou, Jl. cq. 2llbi,.~ 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.•. 
February 19, 1985 
Re: 83-1334 Winston v. Lee 
Dear Bill, 
I have read Lewis' suggestions in this 
case and I, for one, think they would be helpful. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
February 20, 1985 
83-1334 Winston v. Lee 
Dear Bill: 
In light of the chanqes indicated in your letter 
of February 17, I will be happy to ioin your opinion. 









JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.i'uprmu QJ#Url of tl(~~ .ll.tat~• 
,rulfinglDn, ~. QJ. 20~~ 
February 21, 1985 
Re: 83-1334 - Winston and Davis v. Lee 
Dear Bill: 
After further reflection, I have decided to 
withdraw my separate concurrence and simply join your 
opinion as revised to accommodate Lewis' suggestions. 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE:RS Of" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.9u.vrtuu QIDUri .of t4t Jnittb' .9tatt.8' 
)lultiqton, J. <II· 2Jtc?"~ 
February 12, 1985 
No. 83-1334 Winston and Davis v. Lee 
Dear Bill, 
If you would be willing to omit the citation 
to Tennessee v. Garner on p. 5, I would be pleased to 




Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBERS 0 F 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
Dear Bill, 
.ju.prnnt (!fonri of tltt 'Jnitt.b .i\talt.e-
JiuJrin:gtott. ~. at. 21lbi~~ 
February 12, 1985 
83-1334 - Winston v. Lee 
I find that I can go along with your 2nd 
draft in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMISE:RS 01'" 
.JUSTICE Wtc . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.fuprtmt <IJ~tnrl &tf tift ~b .ftatt• 
,.-u~ J. <IJ. 2ll~~~ 
February 13, 1985 
No. 83-1334 
Winston v. Lee 
Dear Sandra, 
Thank you very much for your note. 
Of course I' 11 delete the citation you 
mentioned. 
Since~Jely, 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~ttprtntt (ij1tttd d t4t ~Utb ~bdt.&' 
Jla,glthtgton.1J. <ij. 2ll~'i~ 
February 14, 1985 
No. 83-1334 Winston v. Lee 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 02/15/85 LEEl SALLY-POW 
83-1334 Winston v. Lee 
Dear Bill: 
I was not able until yesterday to read the draft 
+M.t 
opinions ~ have circulated in this important case. Your 
second draft comes quite close to an opinion that I could 
join. I do have concerns, however, that I outline 
briefly. 
1. I thought the Court agreed that we would 
apply the Schmerber balancing test, and much of your 
opinion purports to do this. It seems to me, however, 
that certainly language in the opinion will be read as 
imposing a substantially heavier burden on the state 
whenever a surgical procedure is involved - a burden 
shifting that can be read as departing from the basic 
balancing that is the centerpiece of Schmerber. 
For example, on p. 1 you state that "the 
procedure sought here is an example of ,the 'more 
substantial intrusion' cautioned against in Schmerber, and 
consequently [we] hold~ that to permit the procedure 
would violate respondent's ~ourth Amendment right~  
I am afraid this language could be read - in light of 
other language in the opinion - as indicating a blanket 
~W'"C\ i c.o. \ 
n 
disapproval of almost any me&is~ procedure or at least a 
strong presumption against its validity. This would be a 
departure from the Schmerber requirement that a Court 
should consider all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances. 
With respect to this sentence on p. 1, deleting 
the word "consequently" would eliminate the implication 
that a surgical procedure - any surgical procedure -
necessarily imposes a different balancing than Schmerber. 
2. Your opinion emphasizes that the procedure 
~ 
is conducted without the respondent's consent. ButAthis 
not always be true? Otherwise, there would be no case. 
One interesting point in this case is that it 
could be argued, I suppose, that respondent's strong 
opposition prompted the evidence that a general a~thetic 
was desirable simply to make certain that respondent could 
be counted on to remain perfectly still during the 
pro9edure. 
3. In several places in your opinion language 
is modified by the use of "extremely" and "severely" 
(e.g., p. 11, lines 2, 17: p. 12, line 12: p. 13, line 2) • 
Use of this language contributes to what seems to me to be 
the overall tone of the opinion that ~surgical 
procedure places the case in a different context from the 
Schmerber balancing of all relevant facts and 
circumstances. 
In sum, Bill, I view this as an extremely close 
case. If the 3 tate of Virginia had shown a compelling 
::::::0 
need for the evidence, the balance very well could have 
shifted the other way. It does not seem to me that your 
opinion emphasizes sufficiently that the issue in a case 
of this kind necessarily involves a weighing of all 
relevant facts and circumstances. The term "surgical 
procedure• embraces ev~~ing that may require the use of 
a surgical instrument. The term would embrace, for 
example, everything from removing a small splinter to the 
type of surgery I experienced out at Mayo. I think my 
concerns expressed above would require only the most 
modest changes in your opinion. If you are inclined to 
make them, I will be happy to join. If not, I probably 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Lewis: 
jb;pt'tutt <!fottri of flrt :Jnit.tb ,jbtttg 
:JIJu4htghnt. J. <!f. 2ll&t'!~ 
No. 83-1334 -- Winston v. Lee 
February 19, 1985 
Thanks for your letter of February 16. I hope that the 
following changes will take care of the issues you raised. Your 
first suggested change will be made in the next draft. 
With respect to your second point, however, I am a little 
less sure what to do. It seems to me that, although use of a 
general anesthetic could become necessary in a case like this 
because of the lack of cooperation of the suspect, this was not 
what happened here. The parties do not seem to argue that this 
was the purpose of the general anesthetic in this case, and the 
Court of Appeals stated that "[t)he new surgeon decided that the 
greater depth of the bullet required the use of general 
anesthesia in the surgery." 717 F.2d, at 891. The testimony of 
the surgeon was that it was up to the surgeon to decide whether 
to use general anesthesia, J.A. 91, and that "it would be safer 
to remove the bullet under general anesthesia," J .A. 83. He 
elaborated on this point at J.A. 91-92 and explained on J.A. 94 
that the pain caused by the operation, even under a local 
anesthetic, may cause a patient to "tighten up," which 
consequently could make the operation "more difficult." Finally, 
at J .A. 102-109, he resisted the suggestion that the general 
anesthetic would be necessary because of respondent's lack of 
cooperation. In the light of all of this, it seems that the 
general anesthetic is necessary here for "purely medical 
reasons," as the opinion suggests on p. 11, line 2. See also p. 
3, last line. Would it resolve your doubts if I added the 
following footnote to the passage on p. 11: "Somewhat different 
issues would be raised if the use of a general anesthetic became 
necessary because of the patient's refusal to cooperate. Cf. 
State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super 25, 453 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 
1982)." 
With respect to your third point, I believe that I can make 
the necessary changes. At the top of p. 11, the language merely 
reports the lower courts' views. I would change this sentence to 
read: "Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed 
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of a 
4th DRAFT 
To: J':s~i~eh~=tice ---/ ~ J1 
Justice Marshall t-._ U 
Justice Blackmun . 




From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _ __..L_FE.....,B«-......:..:.2_2_ 1_9_85 __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1334 
ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF AND AUBREY 
M. DAVIS, JR., PETITIONERS v. 
RUDOLPH LEE, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), held inter 
alia that a State may, over the suspect's protest, have a phy-
sician extract blood from a person suspected of drunk driving 
without violation of the suspect's right secured by the Fourth 
Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable searches 
and seizures. However, Schmerber cautioned "That we 
today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States 
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently 
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." 
I d., at 772. In this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia 
seeks to compel the respondent Rudolph Lee, who is sus-
pected of attempting to commit armed robbery, to undergo a 
surgical procedure under a general anesthetic for removal of 
a bullet lodged in his chest. The Commonwealth alleges that 
the bullet will provide evidence of respondent's guilt or inno-
cence. We conclude that the procedure sought here is an ex-
) 
ample of the "more substantial intrusion" cautioned against in 
Schmerber, and hold that to permit the procedure would vio-
late respondent's right to be "secure in [his] person" guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment. 
~ 




WINSTON v. LEE 
I 
A 
At approximately 1:00 a. m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph E. 
Watkinson was closing his shop for the night. As he was 
locking the door, he observed someone armed with a gun 
coming toward him from across the street. Watkinson was 
also armed and when he drew his gun, the other person told 
him to freeze. Watkinson then fired at the other person, 
who returned his fire. Watkinson was hit in the legs, while 
the other individual, who appeared to be wounded in his left 
side, ran from the scene. The police arrived on the scene 
shortly thereafter, and Watkinson was taken by ambulance 
to the emergency room of the Medical College of Virginia 
(MCV) Hospital. 
Approximately 20 minutes later, police officers responding 
to another call found respondent eight blocks from where the 
earlier shooting occurred. Respondent was suffering from a 
gunshot wound to his left chest area and told the police that 
he had been shot when two individuals attempted to rob him. 
An ambulance took respondent to the MCV Hospital. 
Watkinson was still in the MCV emergency room and, when 
respondent entered that room, said "[T]hat's the man that 
shot me." App. 14. After an investigation, the police 
decided that respondent's story of having been himself the 
victim of a robbery was untrue and charged respondent with 
attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of 
using a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
B 
The Commonwealth shortly thereafter moved in State 
court for an order directing respondent to undergo surgery to 
remove an object thought to be a bullet lodged under his left 
collarbone. The court conducted several evidentiary hear-
ings on the motion. At the first hearing, the Common-
wealth's expert testified that the surgical procedure would 
take 45 minutes and would involve a three to four percent 
83-1334-0PINION 
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chance of temporary nerve damage, a one percent chance of 
permanent nerve damage, and a one-tenth of one percent 
chance of death. At the second hearing, the expert testified 
that on re-examination of respondent, he discovered that the 
bullet was not "back inside close to the arteries," App. 52, as 
he originally had thought. Instead, he now believed the bul-
let to be located "just beneath the skin." App. 57. He testi-
fied that the surgery would require an incision of only one 
and one-half centimeters (slightly more than one-half inch), 
could be performed under local anesthesia, and would result 
in "no danger on the basis that there's no general anesthesia 
employed." App. 51. 
The state trial judge granted the motion to compel sur-
gery. Respondent petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court 
for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of habeas corpus, both 
of which were denied. Respondent then brought an action in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia to enjoin the pending operation on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds. The court refused to issue a preliminary in-
junction, holding that respondent's cause had little likelihood 
of success on the merits. 551 F. Supp. 247, 247-253 (1982). 1 
On October 18, 1982, just before the surgery was sched-
uled, the surgeon ordered that X-rays be taken of respond-
ent's chest. The X-rays revealed that the bullet was in fact 
lodged two and one-half to three centimeters (approximately 
one inch) deep in muscular tissue in respondent's chest, sub-
stantially deeper than had been thought when the state court 
granted the motion to compel surgery. The surgeon now be-
lieved that a general anesthetic would be desirable for medi-
cal reasons. 
1 Respondent's action in the District Court was styled as a petition for 
habeas corpus and an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a preliminary in-
junction. Because the District Court denied the relief sought, it found it 
unnecessary to consider whether res judicata, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U. S. 90 (1980), would bar consideration of the§ 1983 claim. 551 F. Supp., 
at 252, n. 4. 
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Respondent moved the state trial court for a rehearing 
based on the new evidence. After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the state trial court denied the rehearing and the 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Respondent then re-
turned to federal court, where he moved to alter or amend 
the judgment previously entered against him. After an evi-
dentiary hearing, the District Court enjoined the threatened 
surgery. 551 F. Supp. 247, 253-261 (ED Va. 1982) (supple-
mental opinion). 2 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 717 F. 2d 888 (1984). 3 We 
• Respondent had moved to reopen the petition for habeas corpus, as 
well as to alter or amend the judgment. Petitioner moved to dismiss the 
petition for habeas on the ground that respondent was not at that time "in 
custody'' for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The District Court rejected 
this contention, holding that habeas was available because petitioner was 
objecting to a future custody that would take place when the operation was 
to be performed. 247 F. Supp., at 257-259. The Court of Appeals held 
that respondent's claim was cognizable only under § 1983. 717 F. 2d, at 
893 (1983). Respondent has not cross-petitioned for review of this hold-
ing, and it is therefore not before us. 
8 The Fourth Circuit held that Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), 
did not bar respondent's attempt to relitigate in federal court the same 
Fourth Amendment issues previously litigated in state court. The court 
agreed with the District Court's conclusion, see 551 F. Supp., at 258-259, 
that respondent had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the 
state trial court. 717 F. 2d, at 895-899. Respondent filed his motion for 
rehearing in state court on October 18, the day he was informed of the 
changed circumstances regarding the removal of the bullet. On October 
19, the state court ordered an evidentiary hearing to be held on October 21. 
The Court of Appeals was "satisfied from the record that counsel was not 
able, despite obviously diligent effort, to obtain an independent review of 
the medical record by outside physicians nor was he able to consult with 
the independent expert in anesthesiology in order to prepare a presenta-
tion on the risks of general anesthesia." I d., at 897. Yet, despite the cru-
cial nature of the medical evidence, the state court refused to grant 
respondent's repeated request for a continuance. Because "[t]he arbitrary 
truncation of preparation time deprived [respondent] of a fair opportunity 
to determine the crucial factors relevant to his claim and to obtain inde-
pendent expert witnesses to testify about these factors," 717 F. 2d, at 
83-1334-0PINION 
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granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), to consider 
whether a State may consistently with the Fourth Amend-
ment compel a suspect to undergo surgery of this kind in a 
search for evidence of a crime. 
II 
The Fourth Amendment protects "expectations of pri-
vacy," see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1968)-the 
individual's legitimate expectations that in certain places and 
at certain times he has "the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Putting to one side the 
procedural protections of the warrant requirement, the 
Fourth Amendment generally protects the "security" of "per-
sons, houses, papers and effects" against official intrusions up 
to the point where the community's need for evidence sur-
mounts a specified standard, ordinarily "probable cause." 
Beyond this point, it is ordinarily justifiable for the commu-
nity to demand that the individual give up some part of his 
interest in privacy and security to advance the community's 
vital interests in law enforcement; such a search is generally 
"reasonable" in the Amendment's terms. 
A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for 
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and 
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be "unrea-
sonable" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime. In 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), we addressed 
a claim that the State had breached the Fourth Amendment's 
protection of the "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures" (em-
phasis added) when it compelled an individual suspected of 
drunk driving to undergo a blood test. Schmerber had been 
arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries 
898-899, the Court of Appeals refused to grant preclusive effect to the 
state court's findings. Petitioner does not challenge this ruling. 
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suffered when the automobile he was driving struck a tree. 
Id., at 758. Despite Schmerber's objection, a police officer 
at the hospital had directed a physician to take a blood sample 
from him. Schmerber subsequently objected to the intro-
duction at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the blood 
test. 
The authorities in Schmerber clearly had probable cause to 
believe that he had been driving while intoxicated, id.' at 
768, and to believe that a blood test would provide evidence 
that was exceptionally probative in confirming this belief. 
I d., at 770. Because the case fell within the exigent circum-
stances exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant 
was necessary. Ibid. The search was not more intrusive 
than reasonably necessary to accomplish its goals. Nonethe-
less, Schmerber argued that the Fourth Amendment prohib-
ited the authorities from intruding into his body to extract 
the blood that was needed as evidence. 
Schmerber noted that "[t]he overriding function of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dig-
nity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." I d., at 
767. Citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949), and 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we observed that these 
values were "basic to a free society." We also noted that 
"[b ]ecause we are dealing with intrusions into the human 
body rather than with state interferences with property rela-
tionships or private papers-'houses, papers, and effects'-
we write on a clean slate." 384 U. S., at 767-768. The in-
trusion perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and 
deep-rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court recog-
nized that Fourth Amendment analysis thus required a dis-
cerning inquiry into the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether the intrusion was justifiable. The Fourth Amend-
ment neither forbids nor permits all such intrusions; rather, 
the Amendment's "proper function is to constrain, not 
against all intrusions as such, but against those intrusions 
83-1334-0PINION 
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which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are 
made in an improper manner." Id., at 768. 
The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin 
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's 
interests in privacy and security are weighed against soci-
ety's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case, 
the question whether the community's need for evidence out-
weighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate 
one admitting of few categorical answers. We believe that 
Schmerber, however, provides the appropriate framework of 
analysis for such cases. 
Schmerber recognized that the ordinary requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment would be the threshold requirements 
for conducting this kind of surgical search and seizure. We 
noted the importance of probable cause. Id., at 768-769. 
And we pointed out that "[s]earch warrants are ordinarily 
required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emer-
gency, no less could be required where intrusions into the 
human body are concerned .... The importance of informed, 
detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether 
or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt 
is indisputable and great." /d., at 770. 
Beyond these standards, Schmerber's inquiry considered a 
number of other factors in determining the "reasonableness" 
of the blood test. A crucial factor in analyzing the magni-
tude of the intrusion in Schmerber is the extent to which the 
procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individ-
ual. "[F]or most people [a blood test] involves virtually no 
risk, trauma, or pain." Ibid. Moreover, all reasonable 
medical precautions were taken and no unusual or untested 
procedures were employed in Schmerber; "the procedure was 
performed by medical technicians in a hospital environment 
according to accepted medical practices." Ibid. N otwith-
standing the existence of probable cause, a search for evi-
I I 
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dence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it endangers the life 
or health of the suspect. 4 
Another factor is the extent of intrusion upon the individ-
ual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity. Intruding into an individual's living room, see Payton 
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), eavesdropping upon an 
individual's telephone conversations, see Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1968), or forcing an individual to 
accompany police officers to the police station, see Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), typically do not injure the 
physical person of the individual. Such intrusions do, how-
ever, damage the individual's sense of personal privacy and 
security and are thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's 
dictates. In noting that a blood test was "a commonplace in 
these days of periodic physical examinations," 384 U. S., at 
771, Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood 
tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an 
individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity.5 
• Numerous courts have recognized the crucial importance of this factor. 
See, e. g., Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 823, 510 S. W. 2d 879, 882 (1974) 
(refusing to order surgery because of medical risk); People v. Smith, 80 
Misc. 2d 210, 362 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (same); State v. Allen, 
277 S. C. 595, 291 S. E. 2d 459 (1982) (same); see also Lee v. Winston, 717 
F. 2d 888, 900 (CA41983); id., at 905-908 (Widener, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d 312, 316 (1976) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v. Overstreet, 551 
S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 1977) (en bane). See generally Note, 68 Marquette 
L. Rev. 130, 135 (1984) (discussing cases involving bodily intrusions); Note, 
60 Notre Dame Law Review 149, 152-156 (1984) (same); Note, 55 Texas L. 
Rev. 147 (1976) (same). 
5 See also Schmerber, 384 U.S, at 771 ("The blood test has become rou-
tine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military 
service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges re-
quire such tests before permitting entrance and literally millions of us have 
voluntarily gone through the same, though a longer, routine in becoming 
blood donors") (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 436 (1957)). 
The degree of intrusion in Schmerber was minimized as well by the fact 
that a blood test "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," 384 U. S., at 
771, and by the fact that the blood test was conducted "in a hospital envi-
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Weighed against these individual interests is the communi-
ty's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or 
innocence. This interest is of course of great importance. 
We noted in Schmerber that a blood test is "a highly effective 
means of determining the degree to which a person is under 
the influence of alcohol." I d., at 771. Moreover, there was 
"a clear indication that in fact [desired] evidence [would] 
be found" if the blood test were undertaken. I d., at 770. 
Especially given the difficulty of proving drunkenness by 
other means, these considerations showed that results of the 
blood test were of vital importance if the State were to en-
force its drunk driving laws. In Schmerber, we concluded 
that this State interest was sufficient to justify the intrusion, 
and the compelled blood test was thus "reasonable" for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. 
III 
Applying the Schmerber balancing test in this case, we be-
lieve that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result. 
The Commonwealth plainly had probable cause to conduct 
the search. In addition, all parties apparently agree that 
respondent has had a full measure of procedural protections 
and has been able fully to litigate the difficult medical and 
legal questions necessarily involved in analyzing the reason-
ableness of a surgical incision of this magnitude. 6 Our 
ronment according to accepted medical practices." Ibid. As such, the 
procedure in Schmerber contrasted sharply with the practice in Rochin v. 
California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), in which police officers broke into a sus-
pect's room, attempted to extract narcotics capsules he had put into his 
mouth, took him to a hospital, and directed that an emetic be·administered 
to induce vomiting. Id., at 166. Rochin, recognizing the individual's in-
terest in "human dignity," id., at 174, held the search and seizure uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process Clause. 
8 Because the State has afforded respondent the benefit of a full adver-
sary presentation and appellate review, we do not reach the question 
whether the State may compel a suspect to undergo a surgical search of 
this magnitude for evidence absent such special procedural protections. 
Cf. United States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d 
l 
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inquiry therefore must focus on the extent of the intrusion on 
respondent's privacy interests and on the state's need for the 
evidence. 
The threats to the health or safety of respondent posed by 
the surgery are the subject of sharp dispute between the par-
ties. Before the new revelations of October 18, the District 
Court found that the procedure could be carried out "with 
virtually no risk to [respondent]." 551 F. Supp., at 252. On 
rehearing, however, with new evidence before it, the District 
Court held that "the risks previously involved have increased 
in magnitude even as new risks are being added." I d., at 
260. 
The Court of Appeals examined the medical evidence in the 
record and found that respondent would suffer some risks 
associated with the surgical procedure. 7 One surgeon had 
testified that the difficulty of discovering the exact location of 
the bullet "could require extensive probing and retracting of 
the muscle tissue," carrying with it "the concomitant risks of 
injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood 
vessels and other tissue in the chest and pleural cavity." 717 
F. 2d, at 900. The court further noted that "the greater 
intrusion and the larger incisions increase the risks of infec-
tion." Ibid. Moreover, there was conflict in the testimony 
concerning the nature and the scope of the operation. One 
surgeon stated that it would take 15-20 minutes, while 
another predicted the procedure could take up to two and 
one-half hours. Ibid. The court properly took the resulting 
uncertainty about the medical risks into account. 8 
312, 316 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v. 
Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, -, 453 A. 2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1982). 
7 The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that "the specific physical 
risks from putting [respondent] under general anesthesia may be consid-
ered minimal." 717 F. 2d, at 900. Testimony had shown that "the gen-
eral risks of harm or death from general anesthesia are quite low, and that 
[respondent] was in the statistical group of persons with the lowest risk of 
injury from general anesthesia." Ibid. 
8 One expert testified that this would be "minor" surgery. See App. 
99. The question whether the surgery is to be characterized in medical 
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Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed 
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of 
I a general anesthetic, 
9 would be an "extensive" intrusion on 
respondent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. 717 F. 
2d, at 900. When conducted with the consent of the patient, 
surgery requiring general anesthesia is not necessarily de-
meaning or intrusive. In such a case, the surgeon is carry-
ing out the patient's own will concerning the patient's body 
and the patient's right to privacy is therefore preserved. In 
this case, however, the Court of Appeals noted that the Com-
monwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to 
"drug the citizen-not yet convicted of a criminal offense-
with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconscious-
ness," 717 F. 2d, at 901, and then to search beneath his skin 
I 
for evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery involves a vir-
tually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over 
surgical probing beneath his skin. 
The other part of the balance concerns the Common-
wealth's need to intrude into respondent's body to retrieve 
the bullet. The Commonwealth claims to need the bullet to 
demonstrate that it was fired from Watkinson's gun, which in 
turn would show that respondent was the robber who con-
fronted Watkinson. However, although we recognize the 
difficulty of making determinations in advance as to the 
strength of the case against respondent, petitioners' asser-
tions of a compelling need for the bullet are hardly persua-
sive. The very circumstances relied on in this case to dem-
tenns as "major" or "minor" is not controlling. We agree with the Court 
of Appeals and the District Court in this case that ''there is no reason to 
suppose that the definition of a medical tenn of art should coincide with the 
parameters of a constitutional standard." 551 F. Supp., at 160 (quoted at 
717 F. 2d, at 901); accord, State v. Overstreet, 551 S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 
1977). This does not mean that the application of medical concepts in such 
cases is to be ignored. However, no specific medical categorization can 
control the multi-faceted legal inquiry that the court must undertake. 
9 Somewhat different issues would be raised if the use of a general anes-
thetic became necessary because of the patient's refusal to cooperate. Cf. 
State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A. 2d 556 (App. Div. 1982). 
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onstrate probable cause to believe that evidence will be found 
tend to vitiate the Commonwealth's need to compel respond-
ent to undergo surgery. The Commonwealth has available 
substantial additional evidence that respondent was the indi-
vidual who accosted Watkinson on the night of the robbery. 
No party in this case suggests that Watkinson's entirely 
spontaneous identification of respondent at the hospital 
would be inadmissible. In addition, petitioners can no doubt 
prove that Watkinson was found a few blocks from Watkin-
son's store shortly after the incident took place. And the 
Commonwealth can certainly show that the location of the 
bullet (under respondent's left collarbone) seems to correlate 
with Watkinson's report that the robber "jerked" to the left. 
App. 13. The fact that the Commonwealth has available 
I such substantial evidence of the origin of the bullet restricts the need for the State to compel respondent to undergo the 
contemplated surgery. 10 
In weighing the various factors in this case, we therefore 
reach the same conclusion as the courts below. The opera-
tion sought will intrude substantially on respondent's pro-
10 There are also some questions concerning the probative value of the 
bullet, even if it could be retrieved. The evidentiary value of the bullet 
depends on a comparison between markings, if any, on the bullet in re-
spondent's shoulder and markings, if any, found on a test bullet that the 
police could fire from Watkinson's gun. However, the record suports 
some doubt whether this kind of comparison is possible. This is because 
the bullet's markings may have been corroded in the time that the bullet 
has been in respondent's shoulder, thus making it useless for comparison 
purposes. See 717 F. 2d, at 901, n. 15. In addition, respondent argues 
that any given gun may be incapable of firing bullets that have a consistent 
set of markings. SeeR. J. Joling, An Overview of Firearms Identification 
Evidence for Attorneys I: Salient Features of Firearms Evidence, 26 J. 
Forensic Sci. 153, 154 (1981). The record is devoid of any evidence that 
the police have attempted to test-fire Watkinson's gun, and there thus 
remains the additional possibility that a comparison of bullets is impossible 
because Watkinson's gun does not consistently fire bullets with the same 
markings. However, because the courts below made no findings on this 
point, we hesitate to give it significant weight in our analysis. 
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tected interests. The medical risks of the operation, al-
though apparently not extremely severe, are a subject of 
considerable dispute; the very uncertainty militates against 
finding the operation to be "reasonable." In addition, the 
intrusion on respondent's privacy interests entailed by the 
operation can only be characterized as severe. On the other 
hand, although the bullet may turn out to be useful to the 
Commonwealth in prosecuting respondent, the Common-
wealth has failed to demonstrate a compelling need for it. 
We believe that in these circumstances the Commonwealth 
has failed to demonstrate that it would be "reasonable" under 
the terms of the Fourth Amendment to search for evidence of 
this crime by means of the contemplated surgery. 
IV 
The Fourth Amendment is a vital safeguard of the right of 
the citizen to be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sions into any area in which he has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Where the Court has found a lesser expectation 
of privacy, see, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), or where 
the search involves a minimal intrusion on privacy interests, 
see, e. g., United States v. Hensley, -- U. S. -- (1985); 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210-211 (1979); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975); 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has held that the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections are correspondingly less stringent. Con-
versely, however, the Fourth Amendment's command that 
searches be "reasonable" requires that when the State seeks 
to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a sig-
nificantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial 
justification is required to make the search "reasonable." 
Applying these principles, we hold that the proposed search 
I 
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